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The practice of meditation has seen a tremendous increase in the western world since
the 60s. Scientiﬁc interest in meditation has also signiﬁcantly grown in the past years;
however, so far, it has neglected the idea that different type of meditations may drive
speciﬁc cognitive-control states. In this study we investigate the possible impact of medi-
tation based on focused-attention (FA) and meditation based on open-monitoring (OM) on
creativity tasks tapping into convergent and divergent thinking. We show that FA medita-
tion and OM meditation exert speciﬁc effect on creativity. First, OM meditation induces a
control state that promotes divergent thinking, a style of thinking that allows many new
ideas of being generated. Second, FA meditation does not sustain convergent thinking,
the process of generating one possible solution to a particular problem. We suggest that
the enhancement of positive mood induced by meditating has boosted the effect in the
ﬁrst case and counteracted in the second case.
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INTRODUCTION
The practice of meditation has seen a tremendous increase in the
western world since the 60s (Murphy and Donavon, 1997). Sci-
entiﬁc interest in meditation has also signiﬁcantly grown in the
past years (Cahn and Polich, 2006) and increasing evidence sug-
gests the efﬁcacy of meditation in health care and the ﬁeld of
stress management (Chiesa and Seretti, 2009) and some potency
to enhance positive feelings (Chang et al., 2004) increase pain toler-
ance, and reduce anxiety (Wachholtz and Pargament, 2005). Thus,
meditation seems to be an effective tool for enhancing general
well-being.
In previous studies, meditation training has been shown to
enhance some cognitive processes, such as the allocation of atten-
tional resources in attention-demanding tasks (Brown et al.,
1984a,b; Slagter et al., 2007). Less clear is the connection between
meditation and creativity, to which the present study was devoted
(seeHoran,2009, for a review).While some studies found evidence
for a strong positive impact of meditation practice on creativity
(Orme-Johnson and Granieri, 1977; Orme-Johnson et al., 1977;
Ball, 1980), others found only a weak association or no effect at
all (Cowger, 1974; Domino, 1977). However, the methodological
diversity across these studies with regard to sample characteristics
and type of meditation is considerable, which renders it question-
able whether they were actually assessing the same construct and
processes.Moreover, there is still nomechanisticmodel explaining
how creative processes operate and how different type of medita-
tions might affect these operations, which in view of the lack of
conceptual clarity may not be surprising. To address this issue, we
tried to avoid addressing meditation and creativity as a whole but,
rather, focused on particular, relatively well-deﬁned meditation
techniques and speciﬁc subcomponents of creative performance.
More concretely, we investigated the impact of focused-attention
(FA) meditation and open-monitoring (OM) meditation on
creativity tasks tapping into convergent and divergent thinking.
Regarding meditation, FA and OM meditation represent the
main techniques of Buddhist meditation practices (Lutz et al.,
2008), even though many exercises represent mixtures of these
two types (Cahn and Polich, 2006). In FA meditation, the indi-
vidual focuses on a particular item, thought, or object. Everything
else that might tend to attract attention, such as bodily sensa-
tions, environmental noise, or intrusive thoughts, is to be actively
ignored by redirecting attention constantly back on the same focus
point. In OM meditation, instead, the individual is open to per-
ceive and observe any sensation or thought without focusing on a
concept in the mind or a ﬁxed item; therefore attention is ﬂexible
and unrestricted.
Regarding creativity, Guilford (1950, 1967) has distinguished
between twomain ingredients of most creative activities: divergent
and convergent thinking – even though other processes may also
contribute (Wallas, 1926). Divergent thinking is taken to represent
a style of thinking that allows many new ideas being generated,
in a context where more than one solution is correct. The proba-
bly best example is a brainstorming session, which has the aim of
generating as many ideas on a particular issue as possible. Guil-
ford’s (1967) Alternate Uses Task (AUT) to assess the productivity
of divergent thinking follows the same scenario: participants are
presented with a particular object, such as a pen, and they are to
generate as many possible uses of this object as possible. In con-
trast, convergent thinking is considered a process of generating
one possible solution to a particular problem. It emphasizes speed
and relies on high accuracy and logic. Mednick’s (1962) Remote
Associates Task (RAT) that aims to assess convergent thinking ﬁts
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with this proﬁle: participants are presented with three unrelated
words, such as “time,” “hair,” and “stretch,” and are to identify the
common associate (“long”). Interestingly for our purposes, per-
formance on the AUT and the RAT were found to be uncorrelated
(Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010) and differently affected
by the same experimental manipulations (Hommel et al., submit-
ted), which supports Guilford’s (1967) suggestion that convergent
and divergent thinking represent different components of human
creativity.
Hommel (2012) and Hommel et al. (submitted) have argued
that convergent and divergent thinking call for different cognitive-
control states. Based on general considerations regarding the
processes underlying human decision-making (for a review, see
Bogacz, 2007) and on the possible impact of practice on these
processes (Colzato et al., 2008),Hommel and colleagues suggested
that two parameters may play a central role in generating creative
acts. For one, people may exert strong or weak top-down control
(in the sense of Duncan, 2001) on the process that is searching for
the solution(s) of a given creative problem, such as an item in a cre-
ativity task. Strong top-down control focuses the search on very
few or just one item that satisﬁes a number of well-deﬁned cri-
teria, whereas weak top-down control broadens the search space
to activate many items that satisfy loosely deﬁned criteria. For
another, people may be able to implement a strong or weak degree
of mutual inhibition between alternative representations, which
again increases or decreases the competition for selection. From
this perspective,divergent thinking (as assessed by theAUT)would
be likely to require or beneﬁt from a control state that provides a
minimum of top-down control and local competition, so that the
individual can easily and quickly “jump” from one thought to
another in an only weakly guided fashion (Hommel, 2012; Hom-
mel et al., submitted). In contrast, convergent thinking (as assessed
by the RAT) would be likely to beneﬁt from a strong top-down
bias, which would heavily constrain and direct the search process,
and from strong local competition (as only one solution can be
correct)1.
Colzato et al. (2008) have argued that practicing tasks and skills
might establish chronic biases of cognitive-control toward states
or state parameters that these tasks and skills require. In their own
study, this argument was applied to bilinguals, who were assumed
to acquire a bias toward relatively strong top-down control and
local competition, so to stay within one language and not occa-
sionally switching to another. Colzato et al. predicted that this bias
might generalize to other, non-lingual tasks that beneﬁt or suffer
from the hypothesized cognitive-control bias. This prediction was
conﬁrmed by the observation that bilinguals performmore poorly
1One might object that some degree of memory search (and “jumping”) is involved
in both the AUT and the RAT because, in the RAT people need to frequently check
candidate items against the three constraining concepts. Indeed, both tasks com-
prise of convergent components (as the searchmust be goal-directed) and divergent
components (as even in the RAT people are likely to consider multiple answers),
and it would be misleading to consider them as pure measures of convergent and
divergent thinking, respectively (Hommel, 2012). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that
the convergent component is more important in the RAT than in the AUT while for
the divergent component the opposite holds. It is these relative differences that our
hypotheses are based on, but we do not exclude that the two tasks are also sharing a
couple of aspects. Importantly, this latter possibility works against (rather than for)
our hypotheses and makes the empirical test rather conservative.
than monolinguals in a task that requires distributed-attention.
Using the same theoretical framework, Colzato et al. (2010a)
showed that practicing Calvinists, who can be assumed to have
acquired a bias toward focused top-down control (Colzato et al.,
2008), perform worse than well-matched atheists in a distributed-
attention task. Applying this theoretical framework to the practice
of meditation, one would expect that particular types of med-
itation practice (OM vs. FA) establish particular biases toward
particular cognitive-control states. Given its goal and character-
istics, OM meditation would seem to call for rather weak and
“allowing” top-down guidance (Lutz et al., 2008), which allows
jumping from one thought to another. In contrast, FA meditation
would seem to call for a strong degree of top-down control, which
steers and efﬁciently constrains the search for the right thought
or concept. If so, engaging in OM meditation should facilitate
subsequent performance in tasks that require weak, “distributed”
control (as presumably required by the AUT task) while engaging
in FAmeditation should be beneﬁcial for subsequent performance
in tasks requiring a more focused control style (as presumably
required by the RAT task).
We investigated this hypothesis by having participants practic-
ing OM- and FA-type meditation, in addition to a third visu-
alization exercise that was considered as a baseline, and then
performing a divergent thinking and a convergent thinking task.
We expected that OM meditation practice would improve diver-
gent thinking but not convergent thinking, while FA meditation
practice shouldhave the opposite effect.A complication that canbe
expected to work against this prediction is that any kind of prac-
tice remotely related to meditation or relaxation techniques are
likely to improve mood (Chang et al., 2004), which again has been
found to facilitate divergent thinking but not convergent thinking
(Akbari Chermahini andHommel, in press). This suggests that the
beneﬁts of OM meditation on divergent thinking might be easier
to demonstrate than the beneﬁts of FA meditation on convergent
thinking. To check whether mood is affected by the two medita-
tion techniques, and whether it is affected the same way, we also
assessed perceived mood.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Nineteen healthy adults (13 females and 6 males) practitioners
of both FA and OM meditation, (the average length of medi-
tation practice in both FA and OM was about 2.2 years), aged
30–56, served as participants and volunteered to the study with-
out a ﬁnancial reward, except a Leiden University coffee mug as
gift. Informed consent was obtained from all participants after
the nature of the study were explained to them. The protocol
was approved by the local ethical committee (Leiden University,
Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences).
MEDITATION SESSIONS
Focused-attention meditation
Similarly to Samatha, which aim is to focus on a particular object,
the participants use the natural breath as an anchor to focus atten-
tion at a particular point, i.e., parts of the body: “During the
inhalation bring the attention to that particular area and exhale
from there.” The aim of instructing to focus the attention to the
body part was to constantly revive the awareness and effort of the
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participant to sustain the intensity of the focus (and therefore the
intended top-down control) throughout the whole session.
Open-monitoring meditation
As OM meditation we used an adapted version of the Transfor-
mational Breath® (TB) developed by Dr. Judith Kravitz in 1980
(Kravitz, 2002; de Jager, 2007). Breath was used as a vehicle to
“set the mind free” and allow any thoughts, sensations, and emo-
tions that arise. “Opening” or “being open” is a key concept that is
encountered in the practice of TB (Kravitz, 1996, 2002; de Jager,
2007). The ﬁrst goal is to open the breath, then open the mind to
any occurring thought, sensation, or emotion and consequently
expand the consciousness to a (spiritual) connection where one
reaches clarity. During a session, as a thought occurs, most often
accompanied by an emotion and/or a sensation in the body, the
practitioner observes and acknowledges the experience without
any judgment. A TB coach invites the practitioner to be open and
instructs the meditator to observe rather than judge thoughts and
emotions, leading to more readily accept all feelings and forms of
emotions arising from moment to moment (Kravitz, 2002).
During a TB session, after guiding the practitioner into achiev-
ing and maintaining the full, connected breathing pattern, the
coach uses certain verbal guidance, and afﬁrmations. Afﬁrma-
tions are self-liberating statements of fundamental truths (Kravitz,
2002; de Jager, 2007). The practitioner is repeatedly instructed by
the coach simply to notice and accept what comes up while con-
tinuing to breathe without pausing (Kravitz, 2002). Examples of
afﬁrmations used in this study are: “I am open”; “I let go”; “I open
and expand my consciousness”; and “I accept myself as I am.”
Baseline session (BA)
As baseline sessionweused a guided visualization exercise inwhich
participants were asked to visualize certain household activities
such as cooking and giving a dinner party. In order to prevent
the attention to be ﬁxed at one particular point or concept during
this session, attention was being switched between (a) visualizing
the activity, and (b) contemplating about the activity (e.g., with
instructions such as “Think of who you would like to invite”).
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
The participant and the coach laid on two separate mats (at a dis-
tance of about 1m) on the ﬂoor; half sitting with the back against
a back-jack. Eyes were closed in all three conditions. The same
instructor, certiﬁed in Samatha, Mindfulness, and TB training,
provided the instruction for all three sessions. Participants served
in three 45-min sessions separated by 10 days. In one session they
performed under the supervision of a certiﬁed meditation coach
theFAmeditation (35min) and completed for 10min (5min each)
a short version of the RAT (based on Mednick, 1962, and trans-
lated into Dutch; see Akbari Chermahini et al., in press) and the
AUT (Guilford, 1967). In the other two sessions the method was
the same except that participants performed the OM meditation
and the baseline session and completed new items of the RAT and
AUT. The order of these three types of sessions was counterbal-
anced across participants by means of a Latin square. The RAT
and AUT were scored by two independent readers blinded to the
experimental conditions.
REMOTE ASSOCIATION TASK (CONVERGENT THINKING)
In this task, participants are presented with three unrelated words
(such as time, hair, and stretch) and are asked to ﬁnd a common
associate (long). Our Dutch version comprised of 30 items (Cron-
bach’s alpha= 0.85; see Akbari Chermahini et al., in press). In the
three sessions, participants completed 10 different items.
ALTERNATE USES TASK (DIVERGENT THINKING)
In this task, participants were asked to list asmany possible uses for
six common household items (brick, shoe, newspaper, pen, towel,
bottle). In each of the three sessions, participants completed two
different items. The results can be scored in several ways with ﬂex-
ibility, the number of different categories used, being the most
consistent and reliable (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010).
Originality
Each response is compared to the total amount of responses from
all of the subjects. Responses that were given by only 5% of the
group count as unusual (1 point) and responses given by only 1%
of them count as unique (2 points).
Fluency
The total of all responses.
Flexibility
The number of different categories used.
Elaboration
The amount of detail, e.g., “a doorstop” counts 0, whereas “a door
stop to prevent a door slamming shut in a strong wind” counts 2
(1 point for introducing door slamming and another for providing
further detail about the wind).
SUBJECTIVE MEASURES OF MOOD
Perceivedmoodwas assessedonce (after all three session) bymeans
of a visual analog scale ranging from 0 (mood did not increase at
all) to 5 (mood increased very much).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Mood scores and ﬁvemeasures (from the two tasks) were extracted
for eachparticipant: originality,ﬂuency,ﬂexibility, and elaboration
scores from theAUT, the number of correct items from theRAT.All
measures were analyzed separately bymeans of repeated-measures
ANOVAswith Session (OMvs. FA vs. BA) aswithin-subjects factor
and order of Session as covariate (in order to account for possi-
ble order effect). A signiﬁcance level of p< 0.05 was adopted for
all tests.
RESULTS
Replicating earlier ﬁndings (Chang et al., 2004) mood increased
after the OM and FA session, as compared to the BA session (see
Table 1), F(2,36)= 59.53, p< 0.0001, MSE= 0.460, η2p = 0.768.
Performance in the AUT and RAT was good and comparable
to performance in other studies (e.g., Akbari Chermahini and
Hommel, 2010); see Table 1.
As expected, all four scores of the AUT showed an advan-
tage for the OM session over the FA and BA session. While this
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Table 1 | Means and SD for originality, fluency, flexibility, and
elaboration scores from the Alternate UsesTask (AUT), the number of
correct items from the Remote AssociatesTask (RAT), and perceived
mood ratings as a function of focused-attention training,
Open-Monitoring training, and Baseline.
Session Focused-attention Open-monitoring Baseline
AUT
Elaboration 0.1 (0.5) 0.4 (1.1) 0.1 (0.3)
Fluency* 19.3 (7.0) 24.4 (7.3) 17.3 (5.2)
Flexibility* 5.4 (2.7) 7.7 (4.4) 3.5 (2.8)
Originality* 0.8 (1.1) 2.0 (2.1) 0.4 (0.6)
RAT 3.7 (1.5) 3.5 (1.8) 3.1 (1.4)
Mood* 4.3 (0.1) 4.4 (02) 2.3 (0.1)
*p<0.05 (signiﬁcant group difference).
advantage was reliable for ﬂexibility, F(2,36)= 10.34, p< 0.0001,
MSE= 7.963, η2p = 0.365, ﬂuency, F(2,36)= 8.88, p< 0.001,
MSE= 29.195, η2p = 0.330, and originality, F(2,36)= 8.46,
p< 0.001, MSE= 1.726, η2p = 0.320, it did not reach signif-
icance for elaboration, F(2,36)= 1.47, p= 0.24, MSE= 0.514,
η2p = 0.075, see Table 1.
Post hoc multiple comparisons tests revealed that during OM
session practitioners showed greater ﬂexibility, ﬂuency and origi-
nality than in the BA session (p= 0.001; p= 0.001; p= 0.02) and
the FA session (p= 0.023; p= 0.005; p= 0.024), respectively.
No signiﬁcant interaction of order of session on the four scores
of the AUT was found, F < 1.
In the RAT task participants did not report better (or worse)
performance in the FA session than the OM and BA session,F < 1,
seeTable 1.As in the case of theAUT task,no signiﬁcant interaction
of order of session on mean go RT was found, F < 1.
DISCUSSION
The aim of our study to evaluate the possibility that different
types of meditation (OM vs. FA) induce or bias people toward
particular cognitive-control states. OM meditation was assumed
to induce a relatively “distributed” cognitive-control state that
is characterized by weak top-down biasing of information pro-
cessing and weak local competition among alternative thoughts,
while FA meditation was assumed to induce a relatively focused
cognitive-control state characterized by strong top-down control
and strong local competition. If so,OMmeditation practice would
be expected to facilitate divergent thinking, as assessed by theAUT,
but not convergent thinking. And this is exactly what the data
show: individuals excel in the AUT task after the OM meditation.
Our second prediction was that FA meditation practice should
facilitate convergent thinking,as assessedby theRAT,butnot diver-
gent thinking. Even though RAT performance was best after FA
meditation, this increase was far from signiﬁcant. However, the
mood scores show that both types of meditation practice elevated
mood in comparable ways. Given that elevated mood facilitates
divergent, rather than convergent thinking and may even interfere
with the latter (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, in press), it
is possible that meditation practice affected convergent thinking
in two opposite ways: the focused character of the meditation
might have improved convergent thinking performance while the
relaxing aspect of the procedure might have hampered it. How-
ever, at this point this is still a speculation that calls for further
research, perhaps using more extended practice.
Our hypotheses are motivated by the idea that particular types
of meditation might establish or prime a particular cognitive-
control state, which then primes or interferes with the control
states needed to perform a convergent- or divergent-thinking
task. A different, but not necessarily incompatible interpretation
might be considered in terms of transfer-appropriate practice. For
instance, it might be that practicing a particular type of medi-
tation is associated with the acquisition or practice of particular
cognitive operations, which are useful for particular thinking task
but not others. Whether one considers this interpretation as dif-
ferent from our control state interpretation depends on how one
conceives of what is a control state and what is a cognitive opera-
tion. From a functional viewpoint, one might argue that a control
interpretation locates the effect at a different processing level than
operation learning – with the latter representing particular infor-
mation transformation rules but the former the implementation
of these rules. From a neural perspective, however, the difference
between the interchanges may be negligible: if one considers a
control state nothing but the current wiring and activation pat-
tern of the neural network, it is evident that different wirings
and activation patterns will lead to different kinds of informa-
tion transformation. In other words, the differentiation between
control states and the rules these states imply may make more
conceptual than neural sense.
Given that our participants were practitioners of both FA and
OM meditation, we considered a within-subject the most appro-
priate option. However, it needs to be mentioned that this design
choice has the drawback that we cannot entirely exclude that
self-selection and demand characteristics have biased our results.
Future studies might include an originally naive control group
practicing FA or OM meditation for some time, similarly to Lutz
et al. (2004),which would allow testing whether self-selected prac-
titioners differ systematically from “experimental” practitioners.
Moreover, it seems important to replicate our results using other
types of OM meditation than Mindfulness and FA meditation,
such as the traditional Samatha. It would also be interesting to
explore possible commonalities with other more or less ritual
practices with and without religious backgrounds. In previous
studies we have found that religious belief systems, like Calvinism,
Catholicism, and Judaism, affect cognitive-control parameters in
rather speciﬁc ways (Hommel and Colzato, 2010). In particular,
practicing a particular religion seems to bias the preferred val-
ues of cognitive-control parameters toward a range that is likely
to generate behavior that is approved by one’s social environ-
ment (Colzato et al., 2008, 2010a). Similar ﬁndings were obtained
with non-religious factors like sexual orientation (Colzato et al.,
2010b), which suggests that it is not religion per se but the selective
reward of particular behavioral outcomes – and of the cognitive-
control parameters producing these outcomes – that matter. From
that perspective, mediation may be seen as one of many cultural
practices that systematically shape the way people control their
cognitive processes.
In any case, at least for divergent thinking we were able
to show that meditation has a speciﬁc impact. This suggests
that not all types of meditation have the same effect, which
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might explain why previous studies failed to provide unequiv-
ocal evidence for positive effects of meditation on creativity.
Importantly, it also suggests that the beneﬁts of OM medita-
tion go beyond mere relaxation and receiving attention from
a supervisor, which participants also received in the other two
conditions. Apparently, OM practice restructures cognitive pro-
cessing to a degree that is robust and general enough to affect
performance in another, logically unrelated task. We suggest
that this kind of practice reduces the degree of top-down con-
trol and local competition and, thus, leads to a broader dis-
tribution of potential resources. This establishes, or biases the
individual toward a cognitive-control state that is less focused
and “exclusive,” which facilitates jumping from one thought to
another – as required in divergent thinking. This consideration
ﬁts with the observation of Slagter et al. (2007) that OM medi-
tation leads to better performance in a distributed-attention task
and reinforces the view that meditation practice can have a last-
ing and generalizable impact on human cognition (Lutz et al.,
2008).
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